Abstract. Users of mobile networks can change their identifier in regions called mix zones in order to defeat the tracking of their location by third parties. Mix zones must be carefully deployed in the network to reduce the cost induced on mobile users and to provide high location privacy. Unlike most previous work that considers a global adversary, we consider a local adversary equipped with multiple eavesdropping stations. We study the interaction between the local adversary deploying eavesdropping stations to track mobile users and mobile users deploying mix zones to protect their location privacy. We use a game-theoretic model to predict the strategies of both players. We derive the strategies at equilibrium in complete and incomplete information scenarios and propose an algorithm to converge to the equilibrium. Finally, based on real road traffic information, we numerically quantify the effect of complete and incomplete information on the strategies of mobile users and of the adversary. In complete information scenarios, mobile users and the adversary tend to adopt complementary strategies: users place mix zones where there is no eavesdropping station, and vice versa. In incomplete information scenarios, the location privacy level achieved by mobile users depends on their level of uncertainty about the strategy of the adversary.
Introduction
Advanced communication capabilities of mobile devices (e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth) enable a new breed of mobile applications: mobile devices can directly communicate in a peer-to-peer wireless fashion and exchange contextual information such as road-traffic conditions [16] or social presence [2, 23] . In such applications, mobile devices identify each other using pseudonyms or authenticate each other using cryptographic credentials.
An adversary eavesdropping on these peer-to-peer wireless communications can track mobile nodes based on their identifiers. In order to protect their location privacy, mobile users can use multiple pseudonyms that they change over time. Yet, because an adversary can link old and new pseudonyms using spatial and temporal correlation, pseudonym changes must be coordinated in regions called mix zones [4] . In a mix zone, mobile users alter their spatial correlation by changing their pseudonym and their temporal correlation by remaining silent for a short period [17, 21] , encrypting their communications [8] , or using a mobile proxy [28] . We call these regions active mix zones. Mix zones must be carefully deployed in the network to reduce the cost induced on mobile users and provide high location privacy. Indeed, the placement of mix zones affects their performance [18] and traversing mix zones incurs a communication overhead [29] .
In contrast with most previous work on location privacy [3, 13, 21] , we do not restrict our model to a global adversary. Indeed, the cost might be prohibitive for an adversary to build and maintain a global eavesdropping system and to sort and process all the received information. Instead, we consider a local adversary with a limited budget that eavesdrops on communications in some regions of the network. In the worst case, a local adversary has an unlimited budget and becomes global. The local adversary has to strategically deploy its eavesdropping stations to gather information from the network. Mobile users can take advantage of the presence of a local adversary and change pseudonyms where the adversary has no coverage [5] . We call these regions passive mix zones. Hence, in our work, users can change pseudonym in active and passive mix zones.
This paper investigates the strategic behavior of mobile users deploying mix zones to protect their location privacy and of a local adversary deploying eavesdropping stations to track mobile users. To do so, we develop a game-theoretic framework to predict the strategies of the adversary and of mobile users. We refer to these games as tracking games. We first analyze the interaction between users and the adversary in a single road intersection with complete information: the adversary and mobile users know each others' strategies and payoffs. We obtain one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium [24] . We generalize the results to a network of intersections using the notion of supergames [10] . Then, we relax the complete information assumption because mobile users may not know the position of eavesdropping stations, and study the incomplete information scenario. We prove the existence of one purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium [15] in the single road intersection game and extend the result to a network of intersections. Finally, we test our gametheoretic model using real road traffic statistics from Lausanne, Switzerland and obtain two important results. First, in complete information scenarios, mobile users and the adversary tend to adopt complementary strategies: users place mix zones where there is no eavesdropping station, and vice versa. Second, in incomplete information scenarios, the location privacy level achieved by mobile users depends on their level of uncertainty about the strategy of the adversary.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the strategic aspects of tracking games in mobile networks. Previous work considered hide-and-seek games in which several users cooperate to locate one target user. Tracking games complement existing work by considering a new type of game in which several users cooperate to avoid the tracking of another user. Our results allow system designers to predict the strategies of local adversaries and mobile users with a limited budget. This paper is part of the trend of blending game theory with security to predict the strategies of the rational parties involved [1, 6, 7, 12, 14, 19, 27, 31] . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the system and threat models. We also describe how mix zones provide location privacy. In Section 3, we introduce the game-theoretic framework and analyze the complete and incomplete information scenarios in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide the numerical results based on real traffic data, and then conclude in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the assumptions made throughout the paper. We also introduce mix zones and define a metric to measure location privacy.
Mobile Network Model
We study a system composed of mobile nodes, such as vehicles, moving in a road network. Mobile nodes are equipped with peer-to-peer wireless communication technologies, such as WiFi or Bluetooth, and can communicate with other nodes in transmission range. Mobile devices identify each other using pseudonyms [25] . In addition, mobile devices may authenticate each other using cryptographic credentials to secure their communications. In order to prevent tracking by third parties, we assume that mobile nodes use multiple pseudonyms that they change over time. An offline Certification Authority (CA) run by an independent trusted third party provides mobile users with a set of pseudonyms, such as public/private key pairs, prior to entering the network.
We consider that the road network has K intersections. For each intersection, we assume the knowledge of accurate statistics: we know the number of vehicles per hour driving through any specific path, i.e. for each entering and exiting road pairs. In practice, such information can be provided by city authorities in charge of road traffic optimization. Based on these statistics, we express the traffic intensity for each specific path in each intersection. The traffic intensity is the core of our mobility profile and is defined in a normalized form as:
where n i is the number of nodes going through intersection or road i per unit of time and µ max is the maximum number of nodes driving through any intersection of the network. Figure 1 shows an example at one particular intersection i.
Threat Model
We consider an adversary A that aims at tracking mobile nodes. We assume a local adversary: A has a limited number of eavesdropping stations to deploy in the network. As road intersections are strategic points of the network (through which all mobile nodes pass), we assume that the local adversary deploys its eavesdropping stations only at these places. Eavesdropping stations have a coverage area large enough to detect mobile nodes entering and exiting the intersection. We assume a passive adversary: A cannot inject or modify messages [6] . A collects pseudonyms sniffed at every intersection where it has an eavesdropping station. Based on the collected information, it attempts to track the location of mobile nodes. Hence, the adversary threatens the location privacy of nodes [4] . 
Location Privacy Model
In order to defeat the tracking by an adversary, nodes can use multiple pseudonyms that they change over time. Nodes must coordinate pseudonym changes in regions called mix zones in order to prevent the spatial and temporal correlation of their location. We can distinguish between two types of mix zones. First, those that, besides the pseudonym change, request user action, such as turning their transceivers off [17, 21] or using a mobile proxy [28] . Second, mix zones where the nodes merely take advantage of the adversary's lack of coverage to change pseudonyms without any other action [5] . In this paper, we refer to the former as active mix zones and the latter as passive mix zones. In the following, we consider active mix zones created using silent periods.
We now quantify the location privacy provided by active mix zones in the presence of an attacker eavesdropping on communications. As proposed in previous work [3] , we measure the uncertainty of A in matching mobile nodes entering and exiting an active mix zone. The uncertainty of the adversary is measured with an information-theoretic metric, the entropy [30] . In this work, we generalize the entropy measure to an entire intersection. To do so, we compute the normalized entropy for each incoming road k and sum over all possible incoming roads with a weighted factor based on traffic intensity λ k . We then divide the result by λ i to get a normalized entropy H i at intersection i:
where R i k is the total number of possible outgoing roads when entering at road k in intersection i, and p i kj is the probability that a node coming in intersection i via road k leaves via road j. The normalized entropy H i captures the uncertainty of the adversary about the direction of nodes exiting an intersection.
Finally, we compute the mixing effectiveness of an intersection based on the normalized entropy and the relative traffic intensity, i.e. the density of nodes at each intersection. Intuitively, the more nodes there are within an intersection, the more difficult the monitoring and correlation processes for the adversary are.
1 Hence, we consider that the uncertainty increases with the total number of nodes entering the mix zone. The mixing effectiveness of an active mix zone at intersection i is:
where λ i is the (normalized) total traffic intensity at intersection i. We now quantify the location privacy provided by passive mix zones. In passive mix zones, mobile nodes can change pseudonyms in regions where the adversary has no coverage. In this way, they do not lose connectivity as would be the case in active mix zones. However, if nodes change pseudonym in a region where the adversary has an eavesdropping station, the mixing effectiveness of a passive mix zone is equal to m i = 0. Indeed, the adversary can easily link nodes before and after a pseudonym change. If there is no eavesdropping station, we have m i = 1. Note that we assume that at least two nodes traverse a passive mix zone and change pseudonyms.
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Location Privacy
As we discussed in the previous section, the adversary wants to track as many mobile users as possible. Its payoff will then be higher when it places more eavesdropping stations. However, these eavesdropping stations involve a cost c s per station.
The mobile nodes also wish to keep a high level of location privacy. But their privacy-preserving mechanisms, mix zones, are not gratis either. There are two main costs that should be considered. First, the cost of changing pseudonyms c i p that essentially encompasses the cost of acquiring new pseudonyms.
2 Second, the 1 We suppose that the adversary is unaware of the sojourn time distribution of nodes in intersections. 2 If nodes used multi-hop wireless routing, c i p would also include the cost of updating routing tables. Table 1 . Normal form of game G at intersection i
cost of remaining silent for a certain period c i q , which leads to a loss of access to the services. The former is present in both active and passive mix zones, whereas the latter is only present in active mix zones.
In this paper, we assume that the aggregated costs of changing pseudonyms and remaining silent are proportional to the normalized traffic intensity, i.e. c In summary, the adversary has to deploy its eavesdropping stations in a strategic manner, while taking into account the mobile nodes' defense strategy. This will lead us to model the defined location privacy problem, using a static game G (where participants play simultaneously), with mobile nodes and adversary as players. We investigate how the mobile nodes and the adversary will maximize their respective utility and whether an equilibrium can emerge between them with antagonistic objectives.
The game G is defined as a triplet (P, S, U), where P is the set of players, S is the set of strategies and U is the set of payoff functions.
• Players: The set of players is P = {N , A}, where N corresponds to the aggregation of mobile nodes and A represents the adversary.
• Strategy: The nodes have three possible strategies for any given intersection i. First, they can abstain by playing A. Second, they can deploy an active mix zone by playing M and finally they can deploy a passive mix zone by playing P . Consequently, the set of strategies of mobile users at any given intersection i is S i N = {M, P, A}. The adversary has two possible strategies A and E. With abstain strategy (A) the adversary does not deploy the eavesdropping station, whereas it eavesdrops on wireless communications at intersection i where it plays E. In summary, the set of strategies for the adversary at intersection i is S i A = {E, A}.
• Payoff Function: Table 1 shows the strategic representation of the game at intersection i. The payoff of every player can be modeled by u = b − c, where b and c are the player's benefit and cost, respectively. Recall, that we assume a fixed cost c s for the adversary when it plays E at intersection i. We also assume that the cost of playing M and P by nodes are c When the adversary installs an eavesdropping station at intersection i (i.e., plays E) and the nodes deploy an active mix zone, the benefit of nodes is pro- Probability density function of the type of adversary
Cumulative distribution function of the type of adversary z i A Nodes' belief in the presence of an eavesdropping station at intersection i portional to the mixing effectiveness m i and the traffic intensity at intersection i (i.e., λ i m i ). The attacker's benefit is then proportional to (1 − m i ) and the traffic intensity (i.e., λ i (1 − m i )).
Recall that if the adversary plays abstain, m i is equal to 1 because the nodes are not tracked anymore. Consequently, the nodes' benefit is λ i and the adversary's benefit is zero.
If the nodes play P or A while the adversary is still eavesdropping on communications (i.e., plays E), then they lose all their privacy benefits and the attacker earns a maximal benefit (i.e., λ i ). Table 2 summarizes the notation used throughout the paper.
• Type: The nodes' strategy for deciding to deploy a privacy-preserving mechanism depends on their knowledge of the adversary's strategy and payoff function. In fact, the crucial point here is that the nodes do not know where the adversary deploys its eavesdropping stations. In order to predict their number and position around the network, the nodes need to know the total amount of investment Γ ·c s (Γ being the number of eavesdropping stations that the attacker can afford) by the adversary to eavesdrop on the communications.
Thus, nodes have incomplete information about the attacker's payoff. To solve this problem, Harsanyi [15] proposes to introduce a new player called Na-ture that turns an incomplete information game into an imperfect information game.
3 To do so, Nature assigns a type θ to the adversary's power according to a probability density function f (θ) known to the nodes. We assume here that the adversary is aware of the costs c i p and c i q . We thus have an asymmetric information game, meaning that the information sets of the players differ in ways relevant to their behavior. The adversary has useful private information: an information partition that is different and not worse than that of the nodes [26] .
Game Results
In this section, we first analyze the game with complete information. We begin the analysis with only one intersection (C 1 -game). We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) for C 1 -game. Then, we extend the analysis to K intersections C K -game. We also present our results for the incomplete information games at one or K intersections (i.e., I 1 -game and I K -game). We prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium at one intersection. We also propose an algorithm to tackle the incomplete information game with multiple intersections.
These analytical results provide us with the best strategies for all agents in the system. The equilibrium for the whole road network allows nodes to define their strategies prior to the network operations. The nodes can adequately place active or passive mix zones around the network, under a full or a partial knowledge about the adversary's strategy. Consequently, this will increase the location privacy in the network.
Complete Information Game
We begin the analysis with C 1 -game. The following theorem identifies all Nash equilibria of the game at one intersection with complete information. 4 Theorem 1. The C 1 -game has either a single pure-strategy NE:
where
λimi is the probability of using an active mix zone at intersection i and
is the probability of eavesdropping at intersection i.
3 Imperfect information means that the players do not know the payoffs of the others but only have a prior belief about the probability distribution on nature's moves [11] . 4 For convenience's sake, we focus in this paper on strict inequalities between benefits and costs.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
The payoffs of the players at pure-strategy Nash equilibria can be found in Table 1 . Note that the adversary's expected payoff at mixed-strategy NE is zero, whereas the nodes' payoff at this equilibrium is
λimi . The detailed computation of payoffs at mixed-strategy NE is provided in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1 shows that participants' strategies at NE are highly dependent on the traffic profiles at each specific intersection. First, the adversary installs an eavesdropping station at NE either if the cost of such a station is low (c s < λ i (1 − m i )), or if the cost is not too high (c s < λ i ) and the mobile nodes do not use an active mix zone at the same intersection.
Second, the mobile nodes play M if the cost of mix zone is small enough for a given traffic intensity and the mixing effectiveness (i.e., c Finally, if the cost of eavesdropping is neither too high nor too low and the active mix zone's cost rather small, the nodes are first tempted to use a passive mix zone because this mechanism provides them with the highest payoff. However in this case, knowing this, the adversary has incentive to place an eavesdropping station in order to earn the maximal possible payoff. Learning the adversary's strategy, the nodes switch to strategy M . Then, with respect to the new nodes' strategy, the adversary's strategy A dominates strategy E. Thus, the new adversary's best response is to abstain. Knowing that, the nodes again switch to strategy P , and so on. Hence, both participants actually converge to mixed strategies, leading to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as defined in the theorem.
We aim now to extend the C 1 -game to the C K -game for K intersections. The C K -game can be viewed as a supergame with K simultaneous moves as defined in [22] . Because the strategy profiles are independent at different intersections and the set of strategies is not restricted by any constraint, both players can determine their best responses with C 1 -games at K intersections and aggregate them to get their C K -game best responses. This supergame NE can be defined by the union of the K NE of C 1 -games as follows:
and the supergame payoff is the sum of payoffs provided by each C 1 -game:
However, a local adversary cannot afford an unlimited number of eavesdropping stations. The total number of eavesdropping stations is thus assumed to be capped by an upper bound Γ . Consequently, the C Γ K -game can be defined as two optimization problems. First, mobile nodes want to maximize their payoff:
where the i th row of vector s N is s N ,i . Second, the adversary wishes to maximize its total utility, with a limited number of eavesdropping stations:
subject to
where the i th row of vector s A is s A,i . Algorithm BoundedAdvCoverage copes with the new constraint on adversary's eavesdropping stations in the C Γ K -game. This algorithm enables us to find the equilibrium of the game under the adversary's constraint for the whole network. In this algorithm, we assume that m 1 < m 2 < ... < m K , i.e. the first intersection has the lowest mixing effectiveness. The algorithm first computes the Nash equilibria at each intersection independently using Theorem 1 (line 1). Then, if the total number of eavesdropping stations among the K intersections is bigger than Γ , the adversary has to remove some of them.
First, the adversary will switch strategy from x i A to A at the intersections where it has mixed strategies (lines 2 to 6). By this deviation, it will never deploy eavesdropping stations at the intersections with mixed-strategy NE. Recall that the average payoff of the adversary at mixed-strategy NE is zero. Consequently, the adversary will not lose anything with this deviation. Note that the adversary starts with the intersection that has a mixed-strategy NE with smallest i (line 2), because that will remove a mixed strategy with highest probability of eavesdropping. If the first move is not sufficient, it will consider the next intersection with a mixed-strategy NE. This will continue until either the number of eavesdropping stations is smaller than Γ , or there is no more intersection with mixed-strategy NE. In the latter case, the adversary then moves to the second step of the algorithm (line 7) and removes its eavesdropping stations at intersections with pure-strategy NE, beginning with the intersection where its payoff is the smallest (line 8). In this case, each time the adversary switches strategy, it reduces its number of eavesdropping stations by one. The adversary obviously stops this removal process when the constraint Γ is satisfied.
Let us look now at the nodes' best response after the removal process of the adversary. As nodes do not have any constraint on cost, they just concentrate on their best responses with respect to the new strategy of the adversary. The nodes' best response if the adversary does not have any eavesdropping station is to deploy a passive mix zone if and only if c Proof. The BoundedAdvCoverage algorithm removes the eavesdropping stations in order to maximize the payoff of the adversary with the available eavesdropping stations, i.e. Γ . This algorithm also derives the nodes' best response with respect to the new adversary's strategy. Hence, the strategy profile (s * N , s * A ) is an equilibrium because no player is interested in unilaterally changing strategy.
Incomplete Information Game
In this section, we analyze I-games, where the mobile nodes do not know the type of the attacker. We begin our analysis with one intersection (I 1 -game) and show the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then, we extend the results to K intersections (I K -game) with a limited number of eavesdropping stations (I Γ K -game). Because the mobile nodes do not know the type of the attacker, they must predict it based on its probability distribution f (θ) that we assume to be known by the nodes. For the purpose of analysis, we suppose that the nodes know Γ but do not know c s that will be modeled by the probability density function f (θ). Indeed, if c s increases, the adversary will need more money if it wants to deploy the same number of eavesdropping stations. The power of the adversary is always relative to the cost of eavesdropping. 
Note that the nodes have to find the best response using the expected payoff, because they must deal with imperfect information about adversary's payoff. Let z i A = P r{s * A,i = E} be the probability that the adversary installs an eavesdropping station at intersection i, in a given equilibrium. The following lemma shows that we can calculate z i A , for any given distribution of adversary type. Lemma 1. Assuming that F (θ) is the cumulative distribution function of the type of the eavesdropping station's cost, the probability that the adversary deploys such an eavesdropping station at intersection i is
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.2.
Using Lemma 1, the nodes can then find their best response strategies that maximizes their payoff. This is shown with the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The nodes' best response function in I 1 -game is:
Note that the adversary has complete information, and consequently can obtain its best response function using the calculated payoffs in Table 1 . This is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The adversary's best response function of the I 1 -game is
We are now able to formulate the following theorem for I 1 -game.
Theorem 3. The I 1 -game has at least one pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. As the Bayesian NE is defined by the players' mutual best responses (Definition 1), the result follows from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
Note that, comparing to the C 1 -game, (M, A) and (P, E) can also be purestrategy Bayesian Nash equilibria for the I 1 -game. For example, (M, A) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the nodes believe that the cost of an eavesdropping station is small, whereas in reality the actual cost of an eavesdropping station is high (typically greater than λ i ). If the mobile nodes had perfect knowledge about the adversary's payoff, they would have deployed a passive mix zone (play P ) instead of an active mix zone (play M ). Similarly, the nodes deploy passive mix zone at (P, E) Bayesian equilibrium due to incomplete information about the adversary, which degrades their location privacy.
We now generalize our I 1 -game to the I Γ K -game by aggregating all the equilibria at each intersection and sum the payoffs of all intersections to obtain the supergame payoffs for both participants. Similarly, this can be expressed as two optimization problems.
The nodes face a stochastic optimization problem:
The adversary also wants to maximize its deterministic payoff, with a limited number of eavesdropping stations:
BayesianBoundedAdvCoverage algorithm enables the players to find the Bayesian equilibrium of the I Γ K -game. The algorithm first computes the Bayesian Nash equilibria at each intersection independently, using Theorem 3. Then, the adversary removes eavesdropping stations at intersections where they provide the smallest payoffs (lines 3 and 4), until its total number of eavesdropping stations satisfies the upper bound Γ . The mobile nodes then find the N − Γ intersections where the expected payoff of the adversary is the smallest (line 7). Indeed, these intersections are those where there is the highest probability that the adversary will remove its eavesdropping stations. The nodes can then place passive mix zones (play P ) at these intersections if c j p < λ j or abstain (play A) if the cost of changing pseudonyms is prohibitive.
Numerical Results
In this section, we evaluate our game-theoretic model by means of numerical results based on traffic data from Lausanne [20] . This data comes on the one hand from measurements of the actual traffic, from 7am to 8am during several weekdays, and, on the other hand, from extrapolated data based on the Swiss Federal census. We store these traffic data in 5-by-5 matrices 6 where rows represent the number of mobile nodes entering at a specific point, and columns represent the sum of nodes leaving at another point.
7 Figure 2 shows an example of a particular intersection, with the traffic matrix being 
Complete Information Game
In this subsection, we first provide the results with fixed players' costs and then with variable players' costs. Table 3 summarizes the results with fixed players' costs. It depicts four different scenarios. In all of them, nodes' costs are assumed to be constant: c an unlimited number of eavesdropping stations first (Γ = 23), and then with a limited number (Γ = 5). In the first scenario, as the eavesdropping station's cost is very low, the adversary deploys an eavesdropping station at each intersection. On the contrary, despite the relatively low price of an active mix zone, the mobile nodes decide to abstain at six intersections, where the mixing effectiveness is the lowest. There is a threshold at m i ≈ 0.2 where the nodes decide to switch strategy from A to M . Indeed, if the mixing is too low, the nodes have no incentive to use a mix zone. Figure 3(a) shows the equilibrium with Γ = 23 on a map of Lausanne. 8 We observe that four of the intersections with NE = (A, E) are located in the North-West area of the map (the four intersections with lowest mixing effectiveness), whereas two of them are spread out. If we restrict the number of eavesdropping stations to five (second scenario), we notice that, obviously, the adversary removes 18 of its eavesdropping stations. In Figure 3 the majority of the intersections, where the adversary continues eavesdropping, have no mix zone. This is not surprising because the adversary is there able to track all nodes. However, the adversary does not remove its eavesdropping stations at two intersections where there are active mix zones. This shows that an attacker may have more incentives to install an eavesdropping station at places where there are also active mix zones than at places where there is no privacypreserving mechanism. This is due to the fact that, at those two intersections, the number of vehicles per hour is quite high, with a mixing effectiveness that does not confuse the adversary too much (m i < 0.5). Finally, we also observe in Table 3 and in Figure 3 (b) that, wherever the attacker removes its eavesdropping stations, the nodes have incentives to change their strategy: they change from M or A to P, which is more beneficial for them. The nodes take advantage of their complete knowledge of the adversary's payoff (and thus best strategy). If the cost of an eavesdropping station increases to 0.5 (third and fourth scenarios), the adversary deploys fewer eavesdropping stations at equilibrium, five in total without any limit on the number of eavesdropping stations (Figure 4) . The eavesdropping stations tend to be placed at intersections with lowest mixing effectiveness. What is more surprising here is that the nodes' best responses change as well, showing that they are not independent of the adversary's strategies. Except for two intersections, the nodes and the adversary adopt complementary strategies. If the adversary places an eavesdropping station, the nodes abstain, whereas, if the adversary abstains, the nodes place a (passive) mix zone. We also notice in Figure 4 the presence of many mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. As c s = 0.5, the adversary balances between using an eavesdropping station if the nodes place a passive mix zone (and thus do not stop transmitting) and abstaining if the nodes use an active mix zone. If we limit the number of eavesdropping stations to five (same resulting equilibrium as in Figure 3(b) ), the adversary will remove all its eavesdropping stations at the intersections with mixed-strategy NE. Here as well, we notice that the nodes take advantage of the absence of eavesdropping stations to change pseudonyms while continuing communicating. Figure 5 provides the numerical results with variable costs and an unlimited number of eavesdropping stations (Γ = 23). We first notice that both players' best strategies are dependent on the other player's costs. For instance, Figure  5 (a) shows that, from c s = 0.1, the number of eavesdropping stations also depends on the value of α. We observe that the number of eavesdropping stations decreases with their cost c s and that active mix zones are used only for small α and small c s ( Figure 5(b) ). Finally, Figure 5 (c) shows that nodes always try to use passive mix zones in order to avoid the cost of remaining silent. These mechanisms allow mobile users to continue communicating, thus increase their payoff.
We then reduce the number of eavesdropping stations available (e.g., Γ = 11) and find that this constraint has an effect on the number of eavesdropping stations only for the low values of c s because for the higher ones, the best adversary's strategy is already to deploy less than 11 eavesdropping stations (cf. Figure 5(a) ). Regarding the nodes' strategy, we notice that, although the number of mixed strategies remains quite the same as in the uncapped scenario, the share between active and passive mix zones changes. We observe that, for small values of c s , the number of active mix zones decreases, whereas the number of passive mix zones increases. Here as well, we conclude that mobile nodes take advantage of the absence of eavesdropping stations to use passive mix zones instead of active ones.
Incomplete Information Game
We model the imperfect nodes' knowledge of the eavesdropping cost c s by using two different probability distributions. First, the uniform distribution U (0, 1) represents the case when mobile nodes have no idea about the eavesdropping cost ( Figure 6(a) ). Second, the beta distribution β (2, 5) 9 models the case when the nodes' belief in eavesdropping costs is more accurate (Figure 6(b) ). Table 4 summarizes the results of the I Γ K -game with fixed nodes' costs, two eavesdropping costs and two distributions of nodes' belief. It depicts six different scenarios with an unlimited or a limited number of eavesdropping stations. In Table 4 . Number of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) among all intersections. the first scenario, we notice that there are poor equilibria (P, E) for nodes' payoff at 13 intersections. At these intersections, the nodes deploy passive mix zones while the adversary is eavesdropping at the same places. Thus, they lose all their location privacy and pay the cost of changing pseudonyms. The nodes have no clue about the eavesdropping costs for the attacker, and thus must lay a bet on its payoffs and strategies. Nodes believe that c s should be close to E[Θ] = 0.5, whereas in reality c s = 0.2. Therefore, nodes think that the adversary will not deploy eavesdropping stations everywhere, but in reality, it is much better for the attacker to place eavesdropping stations everywhere because of the low eavesdropping costs. We also notice that the nodes privilege passive mix zones at intersections with low mixing effectiveness and active mix zones where the mixing effectiveness is higher. This is surprising because nodes should expect that the adversary places eavesdropping stations where the mixing effectiveness is low, and thus deploy active mix zones at these intersections, instead of passive ones. In the second scenario, the nodes take advantage of the limited number of eavesdropping stations to deploy more passive mix zones. Nevertheless, at four intersections out of five, where the adversary keeps its eavesdropping stations, the nodes still have passive mix zones. Hence, in this case as well, the equilibrium is definitely not optimal for the mobile nodes.
In the third and fourth scenarios, we observe that if nodes' knowledge about the type of adversary becomes more accurate, the nodes' strategy at equilibrium is much better in terms of payoff. In the third scenario, nodes make only three bad placements (P, E), and in the fourth case, nodes' best responses to adversary's strategies are very good. They never place passive mix zones at intersections where the adversary is eavesdropping. Nodes know that E[Θ] = 2/7 ≈ 0.29, which is quite close to the actual eavesdropping cost c s = 0.2. This is the reason why nodes' strategies are, in this case, much better than with the uniform distribution. We have also noticed that, in the third scenario, there was a threshold (m i = 0.25) above which the nodes always deployed an active mix zone.
The last two scenarios depict a wrong nodes' belief in eavesdropping costs. Their belief is the same as in scenario 3 and 4 but, the actual eavesdropping cost is higher, i.e. c s = 0.5. This inaccuracy leads to a decrease on the nodes' payoff at equilibrium but not as significant as with a uniform distribution. We can observe it especially in the fifth scenario. In this case, the equilibrium is (M, A) at 14 intersections, whereas with a good knowledge on the type of adversary, the nodes would have played P instead of M . Hence, nodes adopt non-optimal strategies at these intersections, which leads to a decrease in payoff equal to c i q (for intersection i). We finally notice in the last scenario a single poor equilibrium (P, E) and a single better one (M, E). The difference between those two intersections is essentially in the value of m i (both values of λ i are high). In the former intersection, m i = 0.42, whereas in the latter m i = 0.35. Thus, nodes probably believe that the adversary removes its eavesdropping station at the intersection with the highest mixing, whereas it does not. This is why we get NE = (P, E) at this intersection.
Conclusion
We have considered the problem of deploying mix zones in the presence of a passive adversary equipped with a limited number of eavesdropping stations. We proposed a game-theoretic model to evaluate the strategic behaviors of both players in such tracking games. First, we analyzed the complete information game and derived an algorithm to obtain NE strategy profiles for a large network. Second, we evaluated the incomplete information game where mobile nodes are uncertain about the placement of eavesdropping stations. We obtained a single pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium at one intersection. We also derived an algorithm to obtain the equilibrium in a large network. Finally, we evaluated using real road traffic statistics both the complete information and incomplete information games. Among other results, the numerical evaluations shows that the adversary and mobile nodes often adopt complementary strategies when they have complete information: nodes place (passive) mix zones at locations where there are no eavesdropping stations, whereas the adversary deploys eavesdropping stations at places where there are no (active) mix zones. In the incomplete information case, we notice that mobile nodes' strategy (and thus payoff) highly depends on their belief about the type of adversary. Our results quantify how the lack of information by mobile nodes about the attacker's strategy leads to a significant decrease in the achievable location privacy level at BNE. But, as soon as nodes obtain better information about the adversary, the resulting BNE is better for mobile nodes. In summary, our results enable system designers to predict the strategy of a local adversary and mobile nodes with limited capabilities in tracking games.
For future work, we intend to test our results using traffic data from other cities, typically larger ones. It would also be interesting to have more statistics on mobility, such as the sojourn times within the intersections and take them into account when computing the mixing effectiveness, like in [9] . 
A Proof of Theorems and Lemmas

A.1 Complete Information Game
Proof (Theorem 1). We first distinguish five different cases that encompass all possible scenarios. For four of them, we get pure-strategy Nash equilibria, computed by finding both players' best responses in Table 1 . In the last case, if
there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, we can derive a mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium. As nodes' strategy A is dominated by strategy M, it will never be used by the nodes. Then, we can find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium by simply finding the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the 2-by-2 game shown in Table 5 . Table 5 . Reduced C1-game for mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium 
A.2 Incomplete Information Game
Proof (Lemma 1). Nodes would like to express the probability that the adversary places an eavesdropping station based on the distribution probability f (θ) of the cost's type of such an eavesdropping station. First, let us define the cumulative distribution function of the cost's type:
Assuming that nodes know the probability density function (and thus the cumulative distribution function), they can evaluate z 
